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This paper examines the response of NGOs to natural disasters, specifically in regards to 
collaboration efforts. The study utilizes a comparative case study methodology of most-similar 
design to look at three specific disasters- The Kashmir Earthquake, The Sichuan Earthquake, and 
The Japan Earthquake. Within each of these earthquakes the organizations Doctors Without 
Borders, the International Red Cross, and Oxfam International’s specific responses will be 
highlighted. The collaboration efforts will be examined utilizing general questions focusing on 
willingness to collaborate, commitment, and compatibility of objectives. Ultimately, this study 




 Natural disasters are an inevitable problem across the globe that have affected millions 
throughout time and will continue to kill individuals, leave many homeless, disrupt economies, 
and cause instability to nations. Due to the serious risks disasters pose to society, the response 
efforts and prevention strategies employed throughout the international community need to 
continually adapt and improve. The international community responding to these disasters 
includes UN agencies, developed nations, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). NGOs in 
particular have an important role to play in response efforts as they operate in unique ways, and 
are responsible to a different set of stakeholders than governments and UN agencies.  
 NGO actions can often be uncoordinated, and not scrutinized as closely as government 
practices are. This is why it is important to ensure that these organizations are being held 
accountable to those they are attempting to help, and utilizing the most effective forms of 
intervention. This study seeks to examine the way NGOs respond to disasters, and how they 
interact with other responders. It will specifically focusing on collaboration efforts, as they have 
frequently been mentioned in the literature as an area that NGOs have not adequately addressed. 
 This study will use a comparative case study approach of most-similar design, to look at 
three specific disasters. The disasters are all large earthquakes that took place in Asia since 2000- 
The Kashmir Earthquake, The Sichuan Earthquake, and The Japan Earthquake. Within these 
earthquakes three NGOs have been chosen to review their reports to look for specific evidence of 
collaboration. These organizations are all large, reputable NGOs known for their disaster 
response efforts, and who all participated in providing aid following these disasters and shared 
some report on their efforts. 
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 Collaboration will be examined using three general questions applied to all the 
organizations and disasters, in hopes to generate hypotheses to be further explored in future 
research. The focuses of these general questions are willingness to collaborate, commitment or 
trust between responding groups, and compatibility in objectives or services of the organization. 
Each of these have been suggested in the literature as either preconditions for collaboration, or 
components that contribute to collaboration success. 
 Ultimately, this study found that all three components seem to be hypotheses worthy of 
further study. Willingness to collaborate seems to be a precondition for any collaboration to take 
place, as previously suggested in past studies. Both trust and compatibility seem to have roles in 
the process as well, though their relationships are less straightforward. These three general 
questions should be further explored with a larger sample to determine empirical data regarding 




 Collaboration is essential when seeking solutions to complex problems. This is the case 
for natural disasters, where the effects are so vast that no one entity or organization is able to 
solve every problem and assist every person in need of help. Collaboration, cooperation, 
communication, and coordination are all words that tend to get used interchangeably when 
referring to two or more groups working together. However, collaboration stands apart from the 
others as it is not simply about working together, but rather creating something new and better 
because of that shared work (Denise, 1999). Collaboration contains elements of cooperation, 
communication and coordination in order to be achieved, but collaboration is what is truly 
integral to successful disaster relief. 
 For the purposes of this study collaboration can be defined as “the process of shared 
creation: two or more individuals with complementary skills interacting to create a shared 
understanding that none had previously possessed or could have come to on their own” (Schrage, 
1990, p. 140). Though this term is frequently used in a variety of settings it holds significant 
importance to the implementation of real and meaningful solutions to the problems created by 
natural disasters and their devastating effects on humanity around the world. We will return to 
the topic of collaboration and coordination after discussing disaster response, the role of 
international politics, NGOs, and organizational learning.  
Responding to Disaster 
 Natural disasters are unavoidable and horrendous events in numerous ways including loss 
of life, hindering country’s ability to function, and high costs of rebuilding and providing relief 
after they occur. As Comfort, Ko and Zagorecki highlight in their 2004 study, not only do 
disasters create physical problems (such as injuries and infrastructure damage), but they also 
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damage “sociocultural infrastructure,” meaning economic, social, and organizational components 
of communities. This makes disasters a multifaceted problem for nations to prepare for, deal 
with, and overcome afterwards. Sadly, according to studies it seems that natural disasters are not 
only here to stay, but are actually getting worse (Von Medling, Oyedele, Cleland, Spillane & 
Konanahalli, 2011; Mannakkara & Wilkinson, 2013). These studies point out that climate change 
appears to be making storms and disasters both more frequent and intense than before. This 
demonstrates how vital it is for organizations, nations, and governments to have adequate 
responses to these disasters.  
 There are four phases of the disaster cycle that have been identified - mitigation and 
preparedness (which occur beforehand), response (during and after), and recovery (short and 
long-term actions following the disaster) (Von Medling et al., 2011). While mitigation and 
preparedness is vital to a community’s outcome following a natural disaster, there is ultimately 
no way to stop these disasters, only minimize the damage they have done and help as much as 
possible in the aftermath. All phases are important to the process, but this study will focus 
primarily on the response and recovery phases. According to Comfort, Ko and Zagorecki’s study 
in 2004, the initial stages of response involve protecting lives and helping the injured, while the 
recovery periods focuses on long-term effects, such as unemployment, infrastructure, medical 
care and housing. This study also emphasized that proper response upfront can significantly 
lessen the needs during recovery in the long-term. 
 Disaster relief includes a variety of activities to help assist communities that have been 
affected by natural disasters. Tierney, Lindell, and Perry defined disaster relief as activities that 
“reduce physical, social, and economic vulnerability and to facilitate the effective provision of 
short-term emergency assistance and longer-term recovery aid" (2001, p. 256). Generally this 
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equates to improving life and can include actions such as rebuilding, mitigation efforts, repairs, 
regulations and other activities that aim to better the current state of things and improve (Von 
Meding et al., 2011).  
 There are various methods for disaster relief, and many have different ideas as to what is 
the best way to really help. The “Build Back Better” strategy proposed by Bill Clinton following 
the tsunami in East Asia offers a holistic approach to recovery that tries not only to restore 
communities but improve them and make them more resilient (Mannakkara & Wilkinson, 2013). 
Other studies have emphasized the need for information to determine “demand flow,” using 
estimates of magnitude and effect to figure out how much help and supplies are needed (Comfort 
et al., 2004). These sorts of strategies rely on multiple partners effectively working together to 
share information, or create a fully holistic approach to relief. There has not been a consensus on 
the most effective strategy for response and recovery, but almost all strategies incorporate 
collaboration as a necessity to success. 
 Natural disasters are often too vast and harmful for one entity to fix everything on their 
own, which is why collaboration becomes so necessary in assisting in these dire and crucial 
moments. According to Hutchinton’s study, earthquakes specifically, which will be the primary 
focus on this study, provoke two responses from the international community: either they are 
overwhelmed by the devastation and believe the high price of repair and aid make intervention 
impossible, or they see international organization as the only way to help (2000). Walking away 
from those in need would be a mistake by the international community, so the only way to 
overcome these devastating tragedies is to join together. “Large and seemingly unsolvable 
problems are best approached from a cooperative angle, combing resources and preventing 
duplication” (Kapucu, 2008, p. 256). Kapucu highlights here that there is no better way to 
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overcome a daunting task, such as disaster relief, than systematically working to share resources 
and delegate tasks.  
The Politics of Disaster 
 The idea of an international organization to coordinate disaster relief was first brought to 
the table following World War I (Hutchinson, 2000). This first attempt was the International 
Relief Union (IRU). This organization failed due to political constraints, weak funding, and 
difficulty in properly administering the organization. There have been attempts since, but still no 
international consensus on how to best coordinate, or collaborate, in order to increase the 
effectiveness of disaster relief. Most currently the UN has created the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Arlikatti, Bezboruah & Long, 2012). This office is ideally 
supposed to help coordinate the efforts of different agencies around the globe; the ultimate goal 
being to increase cohesion and effectiveness. Clearly collaboration is seen on the international 
stage as a necessity to improving response to natural disasters. 
 One of OCHA’s main approaches is the implementation of “cluster coordination,” which 
divides humanitarian organizations (both NGOs and others) that work in areas such as “shelter” 
or “health” (“Cluster Coordination,” 2016). By bringing together these groups into clusters the 
hope is the organizations will communicate more about the issues that they specifically are 
working to fix. However, there does seem to be some problems in this approach so far. This 
system came into affect before the infamous response to the Haiti earthquake disaster, which 
began public discussions on NGO response effectiveness. This clearly demonstrates that there 
are many issues left unresolved. Specifically, these problems include the lack of mechanisms for 
accountability, an ineffective hierarchical structure, and low inclusivity of local people and 
organizations, among others (Heath, 2014). 
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 One of the problems of the politics of disasters occurring on the international level is 
what Barnett and Walker refer to as the “Humanitarian Club” (2015). This club is “an organized 
and hierarchical network of states, donors, international organizations, and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) that centers on the UN system” (Barnett & Walker, 2015, p. 131). These 
organizations are driven to retain their own power and control over the disaster relief process, 
and therefore avoid change that would move power to aid beneficiaries, i.e. local actors that may 
want to be involved in the process. This is a serious barrier to effective collaboration, since these 
powerful actors are not willing to share decision-making power and resources and often sideline 
local agencies that want to be involved. There is the possibility of positive changes coming in the 
future as these actors are organizing a World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 to address this 
problem, among others.(Barnett & Walker, 2015). Additionally, Southeast Asian nations have 
taken it upon themselves to coordinate outside of “the club” through the creation of ASEAN, and 
using their organization to train workers and share information (Barnett & Walker, 2015). Both 
the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit and the creation of ASEAN demonstrate that there is 
hope for collaboration despite political complications. 
Nongovernmental Organizations and Disasters 
 NGOs have become a large component of the response and recovery process for natural 
disasters. Studies have found that NGOs have the potential to not only help during disaster 
response, but can do an effective job in the mitigation, preparedness, and recovery phases as well 
(Arlikatti, Bezboruah & Long, 2012; Ismail, Majid, Toosli & Samah, 2014). NGOs are becoming 
very powerful in their ability to help with development, stepping in where government has failed, 
and working in many nations around the world spreading influence (Jarvik, 2007). NGOs operate 
differently than other international government organizations do. As Amagoh outlines they have 
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5 specific attributes: they are separate from state organizations, they cooperate with and are 
sometimes funded by state organizations but actions are outside of government influence, NGOs 
are typically not for profit, they are often voluntary in membership and activities, and they 
operate based on ideals (2015). This gives them a very different approach to dealing with disaster 
relief, and changes how they operate in these situations. NGOs face different barriers, have 
different assets, and varying capabilities.  
 The common explanation for why NGOs have gotten involved in disaster relief is one of 
“government-failure,” or that there was a hole that governments were not filling that NGOs 
moved in to assist with (Weisbrod, 1975; Hansmann, 1987; Arlikatti, Bezboruah & Long, 2012). 
By assisting with disaster relief, NGOs are creating their own niche in the process that 
governments currently are not, and possibly cannot, fill. Arlikatti, Bezboruah and Long’s study 
found that NGOs role differed from governments because they focused on vulnerable and 
marginalized populations (2012). This study also highlights the main activities that NGOs are 
involved with when it comes to disaster relief, “basic health and social services, humanitarian 
relief programs following natural or manmade disasters, and promoting the interests of the poor 
through developmental projects and/or advocacy initiatives” (Arlikatti, Bezboruah & Long, 
2012, p. 65). A different study takes this prescription a step further, pushing NGOs to not only 
develop satisfactory projects, but also transform communities using a multi-faceted approach that 
addresses all needs, and is holistic in nature (Von Meding et al., 2011).  
 There are, however, many that find fault with NGOs’ activities in disaster relief. One of 
the most serious allegations raised about NGO aid is that they may do more harm than good and 
could actually be hurting reconstruction (Mannakkara & Wilkinson, 2013; Von Medling et al., 
2011). These arguments suggest that NGOs may rush to get involved in disaster relief without 
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the capacity or knowledge to actually intervene properly, which can make future reconstruction 
more difficult. Another common problem researchers in the area point to is lack of accountability 
(Barnett & Walker, 2015; Jarvik, 2007). This is because they are not held in check by elections, 
they do not fully operate within the free market, and if their projects in a country fail they will 
not have to answer to anyone for their mistakes. So while they may have good intentions that is 
not enough, and without being held accountable for their actions they may never learn from their 
mistakes or they may make decisions without carefully considering the weight of their choices. 
Another problem critics highlight is the western superiority that often colors their decision 
making in developing countries, which can lead to a reluctance to create real partnerships with 
the local communities that they are working in (Von Medling et al., 2011; Barnett & Walker, 
2015). NGOs may ignore input from local governments and people, believing what they think is 
best should be implemented, without considering the perspectives of those who may understand 
the needs of the community greater than they. 
 Collaboration between NGOs has been highlighted by many studies as being a key to 
more effective intervention following natural disasters (Von Medling et al., 2011; Arlikatti, 
Bezboruah & Long, 2012; Lu & Xu, 2015; Ismail et al., 2014). In a 2014 study aiming to outline 
critical success factors for post-disaster reconstruction in NGOs good 
communication/coordination, significant community participation, and government involvement 
were all included as factors (Ismail et al., 2014). All these elements are components of the larger 
idea of collaboration, not just between NGOs but between NGOs and other key players, such as 
community members and governments. Arlikatti, Bezboruah and Long focus in on the relations 
between NGOs and governments, by indicating that the work both do are complimentary of one 
another, which would allow them to work well together if they were to coordinate their efforts 
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more efficiently (2014). Lu and Xu put it most simply by highlighting that when NGOs use 
collective decision making and share their resources they help avoid making the situation even 
more confusing and disastrous than it already is (2015). 
Organizational Learning 
 Organizations need to learn in order to improve and stop making past mistakes, and 
learning almost always contributes to an organization’s ability to perform better (Whatley, 2013). 
This is true of all organizations, including NGOs and is especially true when it comes to 
humanitarian interventions where lives are at stake. Not only does learning help improve 
organizations, but it has been argued that “learning is the foundation for accountability, 
dissemination and influence” (Edwards, 1997, p 235). Further, Edwards’ study points out that 
because of the increasing demands from donors to see results, and NGOs facing greater scrutiny 
from the public, learning is becoming a necessity. Learning from disasters includes not only 
implementing mechanisms to receive feedback during response, but also taking the next step to 
examine past responses and grow from them too. 
 Despite the growing evidence in support of organizational learning in NGOs there still 
seems to be evidence that it is not changing quickly. A study by Twigg and Steiner found that 
many NGOs had difficulty taking learning from just policy discussions to actually implementing 
the change (2002). This points out one of the main issues that continues to arise, learning is not 
just about making information available and discussing it but actually taking that information 
and putting it into real action. Some of the barriers to organizational learning that have been 
suggested include cultural deterrence, highly centralized and hierarchical structures that 
discourage innovation, and too much information with nobody processing it (Edwards, 1997) 
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 Whatley’s study suggests that there are three main components for organizations to 
consider when trying to develop a strong capacity for learning- these are commitment from 
leaders, culture that encourages learning, and mechanisms that support it (2013). NGOs in 
particular may need to learn while they act (“learning-by-doing”), because of the nature of their 
actions it may take beginning to act to really understand what works and what does not in order 
to begin to learn from it (Edwards, 1997). It is possible that it is difficult for NGOs involved in 
disaster relief particularly to learn while they are responding because of the high intensity and 
need for immediate actions and reactions. While they do not have the time to learn while in the 
midst of responding to a disaster, that means that they should instead be focusing on learning 
after so they can apply new knowledge before the next disaster strikes. This is vital for 
collaboration efforts, because organizations need to not only begin to implement collaboration 
strategies but learn from past efforts to improve it in the future. 
Collaboration 
 Ultimately, what is to be learned from the complicated process of disaster relief is no one 
sector can do it all on their own. Collaboration is a necessity and governments and NGOs should 
be working together to allow their work to be complimentary and integrated, rather than 
disjointed and ad hoc (Arlikatti, Bezboruah & Long, 2012). Collaboration, however, is not 
something that can be implemented with ease, which is why it still continues to be a problem 
facing NGOs, international agencies, and governments around the world. 
 A particularly important component of collaboration, which often gets forgotten and 
ignored by NGOs, is working with the local people they are providing relief for. As Barnett and 
Walker put it, “Relief work remains something done to others, not alongside them” (Barnett & 
Walker, 2015, p.132). They argue that there is a disconnect between what those receiving need 
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and the aid being given, and they are not using these individuals, despite the beneficial assistance 
they could provide. While there are obviously moral implications for not including those most 
affected into the process, NGOs are also missing out on opportunities that would improve their 
own efforts as well. Individuals and local agencies have a vested interest in helping their 
community, and often are knowledgeable in ways that NGOs may not be. Lawther in 2009 found 
that when communities were involved and invested the outcomes were more sustainable, their 
capacity grew with training, and the economy was stimulated. Additionally, another study found 
that on the individual level there was a link between involvement in reconstruction and mental or 
emotional recovery of the community, as they felt empowered by their work and control over 
their lives (Sullivan, 2003). Of course there are barriers to overcome in order to accomplish this 
goal- such as creating trust, NGO and government’s hesitation to give power to low-income 
groups, and allowing communities to do more than just labor but also take part in decision 
making (Lawther, 2009). 
 There are additional barriers to collaboration when it comes to negotiations on the global 
level, as well as local implementation. Lu and Xu point out a number of problems getting in the 
way of collaboration in their study, such as confusion created by varying objectives, competition 
for resources, lack of trust between organizations and with the government (2015). There are a 
number of other barriers that can get in the way of collaboration once it attempts to be 
implemented too, including: lack of commitment to the collaboration, confusion over roles of 
actors, temporary nature of partnerships, and lack of management to implement the change to 
collaboration (Charles, Lauras & Tomasini, 2010).  
 However, there is potential to overcome these barriers, and even turn them into potential 
enablers of collaboration (such as sharing resources rather than fighting over them). There have 
	
17	
been a number of studies that have suggested some elements that create an environment 
conducive to collaboration. This includes, similar goals of the organizations, how embedded the 
collaboration is, willingness to cooperate, trust between those involved, openness of the structure 
of the organization, stability of the environment, funding set aside for collaboration efforts, and 
presence of a central coordinator (Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Charles, Lauras & Tomasini, 2010; 
Ismail et al., 2014). So while collaboration has not yet been fully achieved and there is still a 
long way to go there is much hope for NGOs in the future to form promising, beneficial, and 




 This study utilizes a comparative case-study method to analyze the effects of 
collaboration on NGO responses to natural disasters. Utilizing this method allows for 
generalizations to be drawn between the incidents, and allows for testing of effects on a 
systematic level (Manheim, Rich, Willnat & Brians, 2007). The comparative method is generally 
used to discover relationships, and not necessarily produce measurements or quantitative results 
(Lijphart, 1971). This case study in particular is a hypothesis-generating case study, which 
attempts to create hypotheses to be later tested with a larger sample of cases and with empirical 
methods (Lijphart, 1971). Lijpart’s article also emphasizes that the strength of case studies come 
from the ability to deeply analyze a small number of cases, and contribute to the literature 
through building on existing theories. This study can be seen as a process to explore relationships 
between collaboration and other variables in NGO aid following natural disasters, in hopes to 
discover areas for further exploration in future studies. 
 A “most-similar systems design” method was implemented, meaning that very similar 
incidents were chosen with certain elements in common (Manheim et al., 2007). Lijphart’s study 
suggested that one way to increase the accuracy of case studies is to choose comparable cases 
(1971). This allows researchers to hold some variables constant to reduce the number of 
“operative variables” and create a more controlled study (p 687). Another suggestion in the 
literature for creating comparable cases is to chose incidents in a similar geographic location, and 
with a common history (George & McKeown, 1985).  
 The criteria for similarity used in this study is time period, geographic location, nature of 
the disaster, and scale of impact. The three disasters to be studied are earthquakes that occurred 
in Asia since the early 2000s, and were of a large scale. The cases are also spaced throughout 
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time in hopes that learning will be able to be observed between disasters. NGOs may learn from 
past response efforts and apply new knowledge to the next event. The three disasters are 
specifically the Kashmir Earthquake, Sichuan Earthquake, and the Japan Earthquake. 
 Case studies are focused because the researcher is addressing the aspects of the case that 
are relevant to the study, and developing questions to ask of each specific case (George & 
McKeown, 1985). These questions are general, relevant to all cases, and reflect the goals of the 
research. In order to intensively examine the cases under review this study will look at questions 
regarding collaboration and NGOs responding to the disasters. The purpose will be to determine 
what factors may contribute to an organization’s likelihood to utilize collaboration in their 
response effort. Based on the literature of collaboration between organizations a variety of 
factors to create success have been identified. Willingness to want to collaborate, commitment or 
trust between groups, and compatibility in goals or services, in particular, seem to be the most 
fundamental elements mentioned in a variety of studies (Whetton, 1981; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; 
Charles, Lauras & Tomasini, 2010). 
 
Question 1: Are organizations that demonstrate more willingness to collaborate more likely to 
participate in collaboration efforts? 
 The first component, willingness to want to collaborate, can be considered a “pre-
condition” for collaboration (Gulzar & Henry, 2005). Two separate studies have labeled this 
factor as a necessity for any collaboration to take place at all (Whetten, 1981; Gulzar & Henry, 
2005). All of the organizations need to demonstrate the most fundamental desire to want to 
collaborate in order for it to be likely they will successfully collaborate. This will be 
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demonstrated through the reports’ mentions of collaboration, and the degree to which it is 
emphasized by the NGOs under examination. 
 
Question 2: If more trust or commitment exists between the responding organizations will 
collaboration efforts be more frequent? 
 The next general question to be explored in this study is the existence of trust between the 
various partners, and how that affects the collaboration efforts of the NGOs. Both Gulzar and 
Henry’s study, as well as Charles, Laurus, Tomasini both cited trust and commitment as 
fundamental elements of successful collaborations (2005; 2010). In this study we will not just 
look at trust and commitment within the NGO community, but also the host country’s 
government. An NGO’s ability to work within a country can be impacted by the trust the country 
displays towards them in allowing them to work in the state, as well as work with the state. 
 
Question 3: If organizations have similar objectives and services provided are they more likely 
to create collaborations? 
 The final general question that will be applied to the case studies is the compatibility in 
goals, objectives, or services of the organization. This has also been identified as one of the 
features of organizations that can help collaboration efforts when goals align (Gulzar & Henry, 
2005; Charles, Lauras & Tomasini, 2010). If two actors are attempting to work towards the same 
objective or are providing similar services then they have more overlap in their overall goals, and 
therefore this can facilitate collaboration much more easily. This is likely the motivation behind 
strategies such as the UN Cluster Approach. If NGOs (or governments and other agencies), have 
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similar goals during the relief process, then they will be more likely to enter into collaboration 
efforts with one another. 
The Disasters 
The Kashmir Earthquake 
 On October 8th of 2005, an earthquake hit South Asia. Affecting India, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan- but the most damage was done in Pakistan where the epicenter of the earthquake was 
(Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 2006). According to this same report the magnitude 
was measured to be 7.6 on the ten-point Richter Scale. Additionally, it was reported that 75,000 
people were killed, 70,000 were injured, and as many as 3.5 million people became homeless or 
were at least temporarily displaced. In addition, this source reported that 780,000 buildings were 
either damaged or destroyed, as well as many roads, and power and water supplies were affected. 
The earthquake also triggered a number of landslides that made reaching individuals during the 
response more difficult. 
 The response efforts were largely viewed as successful, especially given the size and 
nature of the disaster, and were largely coordinated by the Pakistan Army (Wilder, 2008). This 
created an incredibly interesting dynamic, as many humanitarians were at least initially uneasy 
with the idea of working under the direction of a military. Their influence was largely by default, 
since they were the most powerful organization in the country, and no real plan for disaster 
response had previously existed in Pakistan Wilder, 2008). However, despite initial hesitation to 
work with each other, it seems that because of the intensive work through coordinated efforts, 
aid workers and military officials formed “mutual respect, and trust” for each other (Wilder, 
2008, p 59).  Overall, the presence of a strong coordinating force within the country seems to 
have had an impact on the effectiveness of the overall response, as well as collaboration efforts. 
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The Sichuan Earthquake 
 The Sichuan Earthquake took place on May 12th in 2008. It is also referred to as the 
Wenchuan Earthquake. The earthquake was an 8.0 magnitude earthquake on the Richter Scale 
(Agence France-Presse, 2008). This report database indicated that the epicenter of the quake was 
the Sichuan province in China, though the damage spread throughout 40,000 miles of the 
country. The same source reported nearly 70,000 people were killed, 17,000 more were missing, 
and 374,000 were injured, 5 million people were left homeless. Additionally, it estimated that 
there was an estimated $29 billion in loses for the country. The infrastructure of the many of the 
homes, and public buildings such as schools were mostly made of mud bricks (Daniell, 2013). 
Many of the buildings collapsed in the quake due to their poor structure. The devastation from 
the earthquake was so vast that it is the first time in recent years that China requested 
international assistance for the large-scale recovery efforts, despite their initial resistance 
(Daniell, 2013). 
 Following the disaster Human Rights Watch reported that the country was not adequately 
responding to the disaster (Richardson, 2010). This included examples such as pressuring parents 
of children killed in the collapse of a school building not to seek civil action, arresting reporters 
who attempted to cover the extent of the damage, and other propaganda efforts by the state. The 
government of China was very slow to begin trusting help from the outside world (Richardson, 
2010; Cochrane, 2008). This likely hindered any collaboration efforts that the organizations may 
have attempted, since the government of the country was at first completely unwilling, and then 





The Japan Earthquake 
 The recent Japan Earthquake hit on March 11th, 2011. The earthquake’s magnitude was 
measured as a 9.0 (United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011). The 
strength of which also triggered a devastating tsunami that hit the coast shortly following the 
initial earthquake. This OCHA report stated that the earthquake killed 11,600 people, displaced 
nearly 500,000, and over 16,000 people were missing. In terms of infrastructure damage, 
138,000 buildings were damaged and 17,000 were destroyed. Not only did the earthquake trigger 
a tsunami, but also caused the meltdown of a nuclear power plant. This meltdown released 
dangerous radioactive materials, and caused further displacement and danger for people in 
surrounding areas. 
 The context of Japan is different than the other countries because of the developed nature 
of the county. Organizations often rush to help following a disaster because they occur in 
countries where it is clear that the nation alone will not have the capacity to address the many 
problems. However, when the earthquake hit in Japan there was a delay before organizations 
decided to directly respond (Gannon, 2014). According to one source, the Japanese government 
not only welcomed help from the international community, but “appealed to the world for it” 
(Choate, 2011). There was mention in reports, however, that there was not a successful attempt 
at a national coordinated response from the county, despite their appointment of a member of 
parliament to act as a “go-between” for NGO and government activities (Gannon, 2014; Choate, 
2011). 
NGOs Under Examination 
 In addition to reviewing three key disasters, three NGOs have been identified that played 
a part in all of the disasters. These organizations are the International Federation of the Red 
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Cross, Oxfam International, and Médecins Sans Frontières (or Doctors Without Borders). The 
first criteria for selection was that the organization played a role in the three disasters selected for 
these case studies. The next important feature in looking for the right organizations was that they 
had published at least some sort of report or overview of their work in the country following the 
disaster. Additionally, these three organizations were listed as the top organizations for 
International Emergency Response in a list published by Philanthropedia, a website that rates 
verifiable charities working in a variety of areas (Philanthropedia, 2011). By picking three well-
ranked organizations that all worked in the regions affected by the disasters following the 
earthquakes it allows this study to continue to implement a “most-similar” design strategy. 
 The data collection is largely based on reports released by these organizations. This 
enables examination of their involvement, collaboration efforts, and ability to learn from past 
responses. However, different agencies structure their reports in various ways and are not 
necessarily uniform between disasters. This leads to a limitation in the study, as some 
organizations released much more detailed reports and certain disasters seemed to receive a more 
comprehensive report for organizations than others. However, this variation in reports could be 
indicative of the organizations desire to learn, or a reflection of their developing tactics for 
reviewing their efforts. Therefore, the depth of the reports is considered in the analysis of the 
data collected from the sources. 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
 The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) was 
founded in the early 1900s, and has now grown to be the world’s largest humanitarian 
organization with nearly 200 member societies (Our vision and mission, 2016). The organization 
provides aid in a variety of humanitarian disasters, including natural disasters such as 
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earthquakes. They have four central focuses- promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, 
disaster preparedness, and health and community care- indicating that they are involved in all 
stages of the response process, from initial responses to recovery (Our vision and mission, 2016). 
The international organization responds when disasters are past the capacity of local agencies to 
act alone, and they continually provide support and resources to their offices around the globe.  
 More specifically, the organization lays out 4 specific objectives of the organization. 
Their goals are to: 1- reduce impact of disasters; 2- reduced impact of health emergencies; 3- 
increase capacity to address vulnerabilities; 4- promote values such as diversity, inclusion, and 
tolerance (Our Objectives, 2016). In terms of the specific services the organization provides, it 
varies greatly and is dependent on the situation. This includes, procurement and transportation of 
supplies, community infrastructure improvement, blood donation, pushing for policy changes 
regarding disaster policy, and more (What we do, 2016). When it comes specifically to disaster 
response, their activities include food supplies, cash voucher programs, setting up health 
facilities, providing clean water, psychological support, and more. 
Oxfam International 
 Oxfam International is composed of nearly 20 other smaller organizations that operate at 
national and regional levels across the globe, and has been around since the 1990s (Who we are, 
2016). Their main target is to help address poverty, however they also respond to crises to help 
rebuild. They specifically focused vulnerable and marginalized populations, to try and empower 
them to overcome the challenging circumstances surrounding them. They also place a great 
emphasis on collaboration, working with not only their regional affiliates but striving to create 
other partnerships when possible to create “global co-operation and cohesion” (Our purpose and 
beliefs, 2016).  
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 Oxfam international has six specific objectives when it comes to their overall aim of 
decreasing poverty. These objectives are, improving human rights internationally, improving 
gender equality, responding to natural disasters, fighting climate change, securing global food 
supply, and helping the poor obtain adequate cash flow (How we fight poverty, 2016). When it 
comes to their disaster relief efforts the organization they help in the short-term by assessing 
needs, distributing food, constructing sanitation equipment, shipping emergency supplies, 
providing shelter kits, . They also emphasize that they stay in the country to help in the long-term 
as well, through helping individuals grow and buy food, as well as finding stability again 
following the disaster (How we help in times of crisis, 2016). 
Doctors Without Borders 
 Established in France, Doctors Without Borders is also known as Médecins Sans 
Frontières (or MSF). When the NGO was first founded in the 1970s it had only 300 staff 
members and was limited in how many countries it was able to respond to (Founding of MSF, 
2016). Now, the organization responds to disasters all around the world, has offices in over 25 
countries, and employs 30,000 people. The organization is able to help millions of people every 
single year, and provide quality care at times when it is most crucial. 
 While MSF is largely focused on the medical care of the individuals affected by disasters 
and other humanitarian crises, they also support other objectives. The organization provides 
quality medical care, but also bears witness to crisis and tries to bring attention to international 
problems, and remains neutral in areas of crisis providing medical attention to whoever requires 
it (About MSF, 2016) . MSF has very targeted services that they bring to areas experiencing 
disasters- they provide trained, professional doctors to respond in areas of humanitarian crises 
(Founding of MSF, 2016). 
	
27	
 An important note about the organization is the limited nature of the reports made 
publicly available for the data review. While they do produce annual reports, and detail their 
specific efforts in the country they are much more limited in length and depth than the other 
organizations. They ultimately seemed to be for the purpose of attracting more donors, rather 
than growing from their experience and sharing information about their successes and failures 
for other organizations to learn from. 
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Evidence of Collaboration 
Kashmir 
 At the time the Kashmir earthquake struck the UN was still in the midst of developing 
their cluster approach, but decided to implement it anyway in hopes that it would assist in the 
response efforts (Cochrane, 2008). An analysis performed by the Humanitarian Policy Group 
ultimate found that while it may have helped overall, there were confusions such as, “the unclear 
role of the clusters, the confusion between cluster leads and their own agency’s objectives” 
(Cochrane, 2008, p 20). A similar report published by the Feinstein International Center found 
that there were other problems with collaboration, including too many ineffective cluster 
meetings, a “UN centric” feel, leaving out of Islamic groups, and ineffective decision making 
(Wilder, 2008). Additionally, there is some evidence that many local agencies, especially small 
ones, were being sidelined because of meetings held only in English, too many cluster meetings, 
location of meetings, and NGOs paying competitive wages that hurt local staff retention (Wilder, 
2008; Cochrane, 2008). 
 Despite some of this negative press surrounding the NGO response, there were some 
elements of cluster system and the general response that were found to be productive. It was 
suggested that the cluster meetings “were a useful forum for information sharing and 
networking” despite not being great for coordination (Wilder, 2008, p. 23). Additionally, 
organizations, including the IFRC, were commended on using the opportunity to improve their 
relations with the Islamic nonprofits and groups in the area (Wilder, 2008). As mentioned earlier, 
the contributions of the Pakistan Army to coordinating the response effort seem to have made the 
entire response very effective given the magnitude of the disaster. 
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 The reports released from the agencies themselves showed some evidence that they had 
made some strides in regards to collaboration. Oxfam and IFRC credited Pakistan agencies, 
specifically the Earthquake Recovery and Rehabilitation Authority, as being an organization that 
supported their efforts and helped to coordinate them through regular meetings (Oxfam 
International, 2006; International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
[IFRC], 2012, Final Report). This reflects the strong presence of the government of Pakistan and 
the military in trying to involve themselves in the disaster, as was mentioned in the external 
reports (Wilder, 2008).  From Oxfam and IFRC’s reports it is clear that they also recognized the 
power of having a central coordinator housed in the nation. 
 In Oxfam International’s report, they also brought into question how much their agency 
had utilized local communities’ input into their relief efforts, and even tried to open 
conversations with their stakeholders to find out how to better incorporate them in the future 
(Oxfam International, 2006). While the Red Cross did not touch on the problem with local 
collaboration specifically they did list coordination among their recommendations for the future 
in their report stating, they wanted to “Improve coordination between programmes to ensure 
monitoring data collecting is shared to avoid duplication, save cost and maximize resources” 
(IFRC, 2012, Final Report, p 21). This demonstrates that both Oxfam and IFRC at the very least 
saw collaboration as a priority, and recognized their need to further improve it in the future. 
 Contrastingly, MSF had limited mention of collaboration in their reports of the disaster  
(Medicins San Frontiers [MSF], 2006). The organization only made mentions of referrals they 
made to regional hospitals. Surprisingly, there was even some evidence of the organization 
working against collaboration, by getting their own helicopters for their private use rather than 
sharing resources with local agencies and organization. This allowed them the freedom to travel 
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to areas they prioritized, but did not allow other organizations the same freedom. However, one 
source mentioned that MSF’s desire to ensure independence of their operation was likely 
motivated by their objective and emphasis of neutrality. Since the army was leading many of the 
missions and largely controlled the response efforts, MSF was wary of aligning too closely with 
the group and wanted to be sure their integrity was not called into question (Charles, Lauras & 
Tomasini, 2010).  
Sichuan 
 Following the Sichuan Earthquake in China, most of the attention around collaboration 
was focused on the Chinese government. While many organizations were trying to send help, 
volunteers, and money, the government was reluctant to allow NGOs and outside countries to 
help in the response efforts (Richardson, 2010). This makes it somewhat difficult to analyze what 
sort of collaboration would have been possible if the country had been more open to international 
assistance from the start. However, one head of a health department in China noted that he 
received hundreds of calls from various NGOs, when it would have been more streamlined to 
just receive one call and have that individual disseminate the information to all others (Lu & Xu, 
2015). This demonstrates the mechanisms were not in place for collaboration, but it is unclear 
how much the government resistance impeded NGO efforts. 
 Oxfam in particular seems to have made the most strides to improve their collaboration 
efforts in this response. Their report following their response to Sichuan mentioned 20 
organizations they worked alongside, including local nonprofits, government agencies and other 
NGOs (Oxfam Hong Kong, 2009; Oxfam Hong Kong 2013). Their reports also demonstrated 
that not only did they work with these organizations, but also offered training sessions to help 
build up their local partners and help them increase their capacity in the future. These 
	
31	
organizations were all local nonprofits and NGOs in China that shared similar objectives to 
Oxfam. Not only was Oxfam International working with local groups but they included local 
villagers as well in a method called “participatory work” (Oxfam Hong Kong, 2009; Oxfam 
Hong Kong, 2009). Further, they considered this to be a defining characteristic of their program, 
and felt it improved upon passed attempts to collaborate. 
 The IFRC’s report focused primarily on collaboration with the Chinese government, 
though not local nonprofits. In their report they identify the Mianzhu Labor Bureau and the 
International Labour Organization as being essential for helping those affected (International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies [IFRC], 2012, Emergency Appeal). 
However, they did mention that working with the Chinese government created barriers. 
Specifically their report highlights that the IFRC found it difficult to develop programs supported 
by the international community that were also accepted in the Chinese context, where the 
government had a strong presence in how they wanted things done. This clearly demonstrates the 
lack of trust and commitment on the part of the government. 
 Similar to the Kashmir report, this report from MSF was also very limited in evidence 
and mention of collaboration. The only mention of collaboration from MSF in their report was 
their work with the local chapter of their organization during their response (Medicins San 
Frontiers, 2009). Clearly there is a complete alignment of objectives and strategies between the 
international and local chapters, so working together would have been incredibly less difficult 
than forging outside collaborations. This does not mean that they did not work with anyone else, 






 The situation in Japan created a very different setting for INGO intervention and local 
nonprofit involvement. Since Japan is a more developed nation than either Kashmir or China, 
which made many NGOs and other organizations hesitant to rush in at first (Gannon, 2014). 
Japan had many individuals and groups set up to help, but INGOs had not worked in the area and 
had no ties with them so they ended up sidelining and ignoring them rather than incorporating 
them into their response efforts. So while there may have been a willing host government that 
trusted these organizations, and wanted to see them help there were still barriers to overcome. 
 Oxfam International continued to emphasize their efforts to collaborate with others, 
taking even further steps than in the past disasters. They placed special emphasis on continuing 
to focus on the partnerships with local nonprofits (Oxfam Japan’s response to the Earthquake and 
Tsunami, 2013). In the report, they list each partner organizations, which include both 
international NGOs and local nonprofits. Again, these organizations all seem to be ones that 
match their objectives and strategies closely. MSF also made some mentions of their attempts to 
fill in the gaps of emergency response, indicating they were trying to effectively collaborate by 
not duplicating services (Medicins San Frontiers, 2011). 
 The IFRC does not offer any new steps in their collaboration with the response they 
provided in Japan, however they continue to stress the importance of collaboration in their report 
(Tablott, Staines, & Wada, 2012). The IFRC worked with the local Red Cross, and made 
attempts to work with the government despite trouble communicating. It seems that the Japanese 
government attempted to help facilitate this collaboration, by implementing a “Japanese 
Platform,” a foundation supporting aid and coordination between different organizations and 
sectors. The platform served as a point of coordination for the national NGO sector. One area the 
	
33	
IFRC did make strides in was the meetings they hosted during the recovery stage with 14 other 
NGOs to share updates, and communicate the problems they were all facing (Talbott et al., 
2012). Again, these organizations seem to be ones within their objective areas of focus. Finally, 
in the recommendations section of their report they included a concern for collaboration, and a 
desire to begin building relationships with other agencies and NGOs in countries before disaster 
strikes to aid the response and recovery process. This also demonstrates their desire to continue 




 The response efforts of Oxfam International, the IFRC, and MSF to the earthquakes in 
Kashmir, Sichuan, and Japan were all varied in their approaches. More importantly, however, the 
organizations were all across the board in their efforts to collaborate. In general trend seems to 
be that Oxfam International excelled the most at improving their collaboration efforts, especially 
when it came to working with local people and nonprofits. IFRC also made great strides in 
making collaboration a priority. MSF showed a few instances of collaboration efforts, but they 
seemed greatly limited in comparison to the other organizations. 
Kashmir 
Table 1- Collaboration Results: Kashmir Earthquake 















MSF No No (not NGO) N/A No 
 As is seen in Table 1, the organizations had some success with collaboration, but it was 
limited following the Kashmir earthquake. While sources stated this was one of the most 
effective efforts at responding to a disaster and that collaboration was positively impacted 
because of the military’s lead role, it seems that was not entirely true for all the organizations 
examined here. The organizations here benefitted from the desire of the Pakistan government to 
trust and work with them, though they were not necessarily trusting at first. MSF, however, 
never fully trusted the Pakistan government, likely in large part due to their desire to remain 
impartial. The organization also never seemed willing to collaborate with any of the 
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organization, which clearly made collaboration almost impossible. Both IFRC and Oxfam 
demonstrated limited collaboration efforts during this disaster. While they were involved with 
the cluster approach, they themselves did specifically seem to seek out organizations that aligned 
with their goals and strategies which possibly limited their efforts. 
Sichuan 
Table 2- Collaboration Results: Sichuan Earthquake 









IFRC Yes No (not 
government) 
No Limited 
Oxfam Yes No (not 
government) 
Yes Yes 
MSF Yes No (not 
government) 
Yes Limited 
 The summary of the results from the Sichuan earthquake collaboration efforts can be seen 
summarized in Table 2. It is clear that there is some progress in the efforts collaboration. Oxfam 
was able to create some meaningful collaborations, specifically with organizations that aligned 
with their objectives and strategies. IFRC made attempts, but were largely hindered due to the 
reluctance of the Chinese government to trust them. MSF did make small strides, mentioning 
their collaboration with their own local chapter but had no other instances mentioned or working 
with other organizations, or the government. 
 Interestingly, Oxfam seems to have generated some meaningful collaboration efforts 
even without the commitment of the government. This is possibly because of how much of a 
priority the organization sees it as, or that the trust of government is not always imperative for 
success. Additionally,  it could indicate that because they chose to create partnerships with other 





Table 3- Collaboration Results: Japan Earthquake 




















 All the organizations continued to improve in their collaboration efforts by the time the 
Japan earthquake struck. The organizations all showed a willingness to collaborate, even MSF to 
a lesser degree than the others. The Japan government was very willing to accept the aid of the 
organizations, and did their best to implement a variety of tools to help facilitate communication 
(though some seem to have limited success). This seems to have improved all the organizations’ 
ability to collaborate.  
 Additionally, both IFRC and Oxfam showed evidence in their reports that they were able 
to work with organizations that aligned with their objectives and strategies. This seems to be a 
natural way organizations begin reaching out to others that they find similar to their own. While 
MSF did mention working to fill in the gaps of disaster management, they had no mention of 
specifically working with organizations that aligned with their objectives or strategies. This 
makes it difficult to interpret the nature of extent of the collaboration efforts they participated in. 
 While not directly related to this research, one interesting observation drawn from the 
various reports overtime was the decrease in importance of the cluster approach. The cluster 
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approach from the OCHA is one of the strategies utilized in the international response to all three 
disasters, and is still a part of the UN’s international approach today (“Cluster Coordination,” 
2016). Interestingly, there was little mention of the cluster response in any of the reports, 
especially after the Kashmir earthquake- where it was initially debuted. Even though this strategy 
is still currently part of the UN strategy, it does not seem to be an important aspect of these 
organizations’ response efforts. Their lack of concern about or mention of the cluster approach, 






 Oxfam International specifically seemed to care a great deal about collaboration, and it 
was obvious that it became an increasing priority for them throughout their reports. 
Collaboration was always mentioned in some form in the reports, whether initially as an aspect 
they needed to improve and later as a point of pride (Oxfam International, 2006; Oxfam Hong 
Kong, 2013; Oxfam Japan’s response to the Earthquake and Tsunami, 2013). From their first 
report following Kashmir to their reflection on Japan, they seem to be more explicitly creating 
partnerships with various NGOs and local nonprofits, and even local victims they incorporated 
into their processes. While IFRC were not as quick to implement collaboration efforts as Oxfam 
International, their final report in Japan clearly demonstrates how they had begun to prioritize 
communication and hopefully indicates they will continue to grow in this area in the future. They 
began to work with organizations that aligned with their missions and strategies to become even 
more effective than previously. Doctors Without Borders made slow and gradual progress in 
their move towards collaboration, and while they made no significant or meaningful attempt at 
collaboration in these efforts their trend seems to be moving in the right direction.  
 While this is just a small piece of the NGO network and focuses on just a few specific 
disasters, these organizations are some of the front runners when it comes to involvement and 
response to natural disasters. The hypotheses generated in this comparative case study, seem to 
have promise for further exploration in future empirical studies on NGO collaboration. Some 
seem to have a stronger correlation than others with collaboration efforts, but all seem to be 




Question 1: Are organizations that demonstrate more willingness to collaborate more likely to 
participate in efforts? 
 There was not a single instance of collaboration in these case studies that happened 
without the willingness of the organization to want to be involved in collaboration efforts. All the 
organizations had to at least mention a conscious effort to want to work with other organizations 
or the government in order for this factor to be considered affirmative. This does provide further 
evidence to support the theory that this is precondition for collaboration to take place. Not only is 
it intuitive that organizations need to be consciously on board with supporting collaboration, but 
the data collected here further supports this question. 
 
Question 2: If more trust or commitment exists between the responding organizations will 
collaboration efforts be more frequent? 
 This question seems to have more mixed results than the first. While it does not seem to 
be a precondition, like willingness, in that collaboration was still possible without the mutual 
trust and commitment of the organizations and the government there still does seem to be 
support for its inclusion. In all instances where there was mutual trust between the government 
and the NGOs there was some level of collaboration, whether it was meaningful or just limited 
efforts. However, in China where there was not trust or commitment from the government all the 
organizations had varying degrees of collaboration that they participated in. It seems that while 
this may have been a barrier to collaboration, as IFRC seemed to suggest in their report, it was 
not impossible to get around. Oxfam in particular did an effective job of working with other non-
government organizations in the country to avoid this lack of trust problem. Additionally, when 
the lack of trust came from the organization, in the case of MSF and Pakistan, there was no trust 
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present at all. This could imply that while a government trust is a benefit to collaboration, 
organizational trust is more of a necessity. Ultimately, more research would need to be 
conducted to understand the cause of this variation. 
 
Question 3: If  organizations have similar objectives and services provided are they more likely 
to create collaborations? 
 Organizations that have similar objectives and services seem to be more likely to 
collaborate. Like with the trust variable, it does not seem to be a necessity for collaboration. 
There were a few instances of collaboration that occurred without the presence of similar 
objectives. However, it seems that when organizations did have meaningful collaboration 
attempts they were with other organizations that had those similar objectives and services. This 
relationship is not straightforward, and would benefit from further research into its intricacies. 
 
 There were some limitations with this study. Firstly the study only focused on three 
specific cases within a single geographic area, which limits its transferability to other disasters or 
organizations. The organizations were also all larger NGOs, which means they may be even less 
representative of the smaller actors. The primary limitation in this study is the varying nature of 
the reports examined. There is not a standardized reporting method between organizations, or 
even within them. This means that the reports from the different organizations look very 
different from one another and included a variety of different information. Additionally, even 
from one disaster to another the organizations formatted their reports in very different ways as 
well. This means that sometimes it was not possible to gather the necessary information, which is 
why “N/A” was sometimes seen in Table 1, 2 and 3. It also means that there may have been 
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instances of collaboration that happened but were just not mentioned in the report because the 
agency did not see it as part of the report’s objectives. This is one of the reasons why more 
research should be done to elaborate upon the findings in this study. 
 While there are limitations in this study, it generates a group of hypotheses that should be 
further tested to determine their relation to collaboration efforts. Future studies should firstly 
attempt to fill in the gaps where information could not be found just through the method of report 
reviewing. For example, discussing alignment of goals with other agencies, or explicitly asking 
about agency’s willingness to collaborate. More empirical studies could be used to actually 
determine the casualty of these variables in instances of collaboration. Another area for future 
study is the use of regional and international reporting on collaboration, to utilize a third-party 
view of the efforts. This would help to determine whether or not NGOs are being consistent or 
biased in their organizational reports of their efforts following these disasters. Utilizing both 
international news reports (such as the Washington Post or BBC) and more local news agencies 
it would allow for a fuller picture of collaboration to come together. 
 Another suggestion for future research is the follow-up to determine if organizations are 
actually learning. While it appears here that they seem to be improving over time there is not 
clear evidence that organizational learning is necessarily place. Future studies could further 
explore this topic of organizational learning as it applies to collaboration, and possibly other 
areas of NGO work in natural disasters. Learning is an important part of the response process 
because these organizations should ideally be continuing to improve their response efforts 
overtime to become more effective and ultimately save more lives.  
 Willingness to collaborate, trust and commitment, and alignment of goals should all 
continue to be explored to expand this area of study. Collaboration continues to be a key point of 
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discuss in collaboration efforts, but also seems to be appearing more frequently in organization’s 
reports. This gives all the more support to researching the factors that encourage the successful 
implementation of collaboration. As NGOs begin to utilize this method more frequently in their 
response efforts, they should be aware of the context and conditions of collaboration that give 
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